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ABSTRACT

During the Johnson Administration the Presidency remained centrally involved in the education policy system. The usual flow of demands from the field and the education associations, through Congress and USOE, continued. However, the innovativeness which the President sought could not be obtained, so it was believed, if the bureaucracy remained the primary source of legislative proposals and other policy suggestions. The result was the establishment of a special means of generating new ideas -- the task force. Participants in these task forces became highly critical of USOE and its supportive clientele groups, a view met with some resentment and hostility in those quarters. The major policy innovations occurred in the legislation of 1964 and 1965. However, by the start of the 90th Congress in January 1967, a new equilibrium involving the Presidency, USOE, its clientele groups, and the congressional subcommittees had been established. The dominance of the Presidency in policy formation still existed, but the system lacked resources to sustain additional major policy innovations. Much of the machinery set up in the 1960s has since been dismantled, but the policies and programs that implement them remain largely in effect. USOE and the establishment associations continue to function as integral parts of the educational policy system while the task force reports rest in the L.B.J. Library. (Author/JF)

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EXECUTIVE BRANCH POLICY FORMULATION FOR EDUCATION: THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

by

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EXECUTIVE BRANCH POLICY FORMULATION FOR EDUCATION:
THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

In studying national educational policy-making I have sought to increase understanding of the process through the use of a modified systems model as a conceptual framework. Central to the concept of a policy system is a process whereby inputs, i.e., demands and support, from organized interests, concerned individuals, and the mass public are converted into policy outputs and ultimately fed back in the form of new inputs. The conversion process, the making of national policy, is the basic activity of the policy system. The national policy process in education is more or less continuous, but for analytical purposes it is helpful to divide it into three sequential stages, formulation, adoption, and implementation and feedback. This paper examines the formulation stage of the educational policy process as it occured during the Johnson Administration.

The analysis of the formulative stage of the policy process raises a host of intriguing questions for which there are comparatively few definitive answers. What my interviews with participants in the educational policy system and other data generate in abundance, however, are tentative interpretations and suggestive explanations. The principal questions that will guide this inquiry focus on the origination of ideas and their movement onto the agenda for action. For example:

Where do ideas originate?
How are they moved forward?
What means are employed to establish an agenda for action?
What and who determine which ideas are not included on the agenda?
Who does not contribute to setting the agenda?
What roles do individuals and institutions play?

The question of where ideas come from is almost impossible to answer with precision. The task of tracing the exact origin of significant new policy proposals may be fruitless, but it does seem that Adam Yarmolinsky's suggestion of a "theory of simultaneous and seemingly spontaneous invention"[1] applies to education. For instance, no less than four people (Francis Keppel, Senator Wayne Morse, his aide Charles Lee, and Representative Roman Pucinski) are credited with or claimed credit for tying aid to elementary and secondary education to the war on poverty in a manner that facilitated circumvention of the church-state issue. A major source of new ideas in education is, naturally, the academic community. Academia was the origin of such ~~Johnson-era~~ suggestions as the Educational Opportunity Bank, the voucher system, and open schools. Proposals for institutional grants in higher education originated with several unknown university and college presidents and were advanced by most national associations in higher education.

In addition, the NEA maintained its own sizeable research staff and, until 1963, supported jointly with the AASA, the highly respected elite group of educators and laymen known as the Educational Policies Commission. The philanthropic foundations have devoted much of their energy and resources to generating and demonstrating new approaches and techniques for solving a wide range of problems in education. Professionals in the field and line administrators in government agencies continually make suggestions that filter up through professional associations, educational institutions, and public bureaucracies to the point where one or more members of the policy system adopt and advocate them.

Economic and political conditions outside the policy system have a substantial impact on the speed with which an idea moves ahead. General aid to elementary and secondary education provides a case in point. A familiar proposal of the NEA since the 1940's, it has been advocated in turn by congressional liberals and conservatives but never adopted. The threat it presented to other values, first local control of the schools and later a presidential commitment to educational change, made adoption too costly. Meanwhile numerous other proposals have appeared been adopted, and in some cases terminated.

The factors that account for the success or failure of an idea or that explain the duration of its gestation are too complex to describe in detail. Some of the more prominent influences seem quite manifest, however. They include cost, in absolute terms and in relation to competitive programs; the threat that they present to established interests and values; the level of presidential interest and the President's policy objectives; the individuals in the policy system who endorse and oppose the idea; and the political climate. Generally, but not always, ideas that carry a high price tag will have a more difficult time than those that do not, especially if there is intense competition for funds. Ideas that sharply challenge the status quo, and many innovative proposals do just that, tend to be resisted more actively than those which make incremental changes. Ideas which can be subjected to bargaining will probably move more rapidly toward adoption, albeit in amended form, than those which are not negotiable. Presidential support and approval is virtually a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the successful embodiment

of an idea in policy. Key individuals who possess great prestige or are highly skilled in manipulating the policy system can contribute to the progress or blocking of an idea. And, if the political climate is receptive or hostile to new policies an idea's chances will be affected accordingly.

There was no shortage of ideas in the education policy system during the Johnson Administration. A major problem confronting the policy-makers, however, was that of discriminating between viable proposals and suggestions which, regardless of their merit, had little or no chance of adoption. As knowledgeable and expert as they were, the policy system participants still required some means of analyzing a vast amount of information and synthesizing it into an ordered agenda for action. In education, as in other national policy systems, the presidency performed this function through the preparation of the President's legislative program and the budget. These documents, i.e., presidential messages and the annual budget, and specific authorization and appropriation bills, served as the basis of congressional action. They establish a set of definite, but not inflexible, boundaries within which most serious policy deliberation occurs.

The policy formulation stage is crucial for it is where major innovations are spawned and matured. In all but the most exceptional circumstances, new policy departures and significant changes in existing policy must survive the process of agenda setting in order to receive consideration in Congress. This does not mean that modest, incremental changes are not possible without formal incorporation in the presidential policy agenda. They occur routinely through

legislative and bureaucratic initiative. Nor does it deny the probability that presidentially supported proposals may be defeated or substantially modified by subsequent action elsewhere in the policy system. But it is manifest that unless and until major policy innovations, e.g., educational vouchers, federally funded open schools, institutional grants to colleges and universities, unrestricted block grants to the states, full expense loans to college students with long term repayment, and similar proposals are accorded a high presidential priority, the chances of their adoption and implementation are very small.

In establishing priorities, or in setting his policy agenda, the President necessarily employs the resources of his staff, the Bureau of the Budget, and other units of the Executive Office. In this respect, it is more accurate to speak of policy formulation by the presidency, with the President as the principal individual participant in that institution. The general pattern of presidential policy formulation was developed under Presidents Roosevelt and Truman and had become a systematic routine by the early years of the Eisenhower Administration.[2]

The legislative program emerged from proposals prepared by departments and agencies who based them on administrative experience and suggestions and ideas from their clientele groups. The presidency was dependent on the bureaucracy for information, ideas, and new policy proposals. While the bureaucracy had vast information resources and no end of proposals, its perspective was limited and it tended over time to offer suggestions that were remedial and incremental rather than innovative and imaginative. The limits of

bureaucratic initiative are almost an article of faith in the presidency. White House staff members and Budget Bureau officials during the Johnson Administration were particularly skeptical of the capacity of HEW and USOE to be effective agents of change in American education. They usually viewed agency proposals as status quo-inspired and regarded money to fund programs in the "old-line" agencies as having been poured "down a rat hole." A high ranking Bureau of the Budget official, Philip S. Hughes, summed up this presidential staff perspective:

> ...The routine way to develop a legislative program has been to ask the departments to generate proposals. Each agency sends its ideas through channels, which means that the ideas are limited by the imagination of the old-line agencies. They tend to be repetitive--the same proposals year after year. When the ideas of the different agencies reach the departmental level, all kinds of objections are raised, especially objections that new notions may somehow infringe on the rights of some other agency in the department. By the time a legislative proposal from a department reaches the President, it's a pretty well-compromised product.[5]

TASK FORCES AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

The last three Presidents have sought to overcome some of the liabilities of their dependence on the bureaucracy in program development through the use of task forces of experts, knowledgeable laymen, and public officials. President Kennedy commissioned 29 and President Nixon 13 task forces to report on a wide range of policy problems prior to their inaugurations. The reports of these preinauguration task forces provided a reservoir of proposals which policy-makers used during the ensuing presidential administrations Neither President continued to use task forces systematically, although each appointed similar groups on an ad hoc basis to deal with a variety

of domestic and foreign policy problems.

Shortly after taking office, President Johnson appointed a series of task forces to study specific policy areas.[4] Acting at the suggestion of advisers who were familiar with the Kennedy task forces, President Johnson sought to obtain ideas and suggestions from outside the Federal government which would serve as the basis of a legislative program that was distinctively his own. In order to avoid having to defend the proposals before they became the basis for action, Johnson directed that the task forces operate under a cloak of secrecy. Their members, the content of their hearings, their deliberations, and their reports were not made public during his incumbency.

The 1964 experience with task force operations was deemed so successful that it was refined and expanded in the following years. Under the direction of Special Assistant Joseph A. Califano, the White House staff assumed the paramount role in setting the framework for legislative and administrative policy-making. President Johnson brought the function of policy planning more effectively under his control through the integration of the task force operation with legislative submissions and budget review and the creation of a small policy staff under one of his key assistants.[5] The impact of the departments and agencies in the development of the presidential legislative program may still have been considerable, but it tended to come more through the participation of their policy-level personnel in White House meetings where task force reports were evaluated. Commissioner Harold Howe II acknowledged that during the Johnson Administration "much policy development in education

has moved from here (USOE) to the White House."[6] Similarly, a career official in the Bureau of the Budget observed that "at the stage of developing the presidential legislative program, the task force reports play a more significant role than any documents or proposals emanating from the agencies."[7]

The agencies proposed a substantial amount of technical legislation which corrected defects and filled gaps in existing statutes but the most important substantive contributions came from elsewhere. "The task forces presented us with meaty propositions to which we could react," recalled a former Budget Bureau official, "not the nuts and bolts stuff which we usually got from the agencies."[8] The agencies also made major contributions to public policy by refining and making workable the general ideas of the task forces in the course of drafting bills and implementing programs, but their participation in the formulative stages was somewhat reduced during the Johnson Administration.[9]

The assignment of a task force to examine an idea or a set of related ideas signified that the President and his top advisors regarded the problem as one of considerable importance. Task force assignments, which varied in scope and purpose, determined whether their members would be drawn from people outside or inside the government or from both groups. Outside task forces were the primary means of securing new ideas for the development of policy. According to participants on various task forces in education, they received broad directives which accorded them maximum freedom to come forth with ideas. Some adjustment occured in the functions of outside task forces following their inception in 1964. In the

words of one participant, the 1965 task forces were "happenings". President Johnson used them as ad hoc devices to develop proposals which almost immediately became part of his legislative program. By 1966 the task forces were a normal and rather elaborate aspect of the operations of the presidence. The President began to use them to take a long-range view of major policy areas and problems as well as to develop legislative proposals.

As compared to outside task forces, inside or interagency task forces functioned more to coordinate agency approaches, to obtain some measure of interagency agreement in areas of dispute, and to review, in broad terms, the recommendations of outside task forces. While interagency groups may have generated some new proposals, their major purpose was to provide the President with a coordinated overview of functional problems that cut across departmental and agency lines and to suggest alternative solutions. An important aspect of this coordinating function of the inside task forces was to conduct a "detailed pricing out of all proposals."

Once the task forces had written their reports, they submitted them to the President and deposited them with the Bureau of the Budget. Usually, outside task forces reported in the Fall. (It is necessary to say "usually" because the entire process of policy formulation is flexible and somewhat unstructured. What happens in any given case may be and often is dependent on ideosyncratic personal and situational variables. There is a great temptation for the analyst to impose a more rational order on the patterns of the governmental process than may be empirically justified).[10] Then the Bureau and the relevant departments and

agencies (if the latter were consulted as they frequently but not always were) forwarded their comments directly to the White House.

Following the initial evaluation, the White House staff, under Joseph Califano's direction, took the lead in winnowing down task force proposals. If it appeared that an outside task force report should be followed by an interagency task force, that decision was made by Califano, the Budget Director, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and the appropriate department and agency heads. Otherwise, in a series of White House meetings, the department and agency heads and their top assistants, representatives of the Bureau of the Budget's examining divisions, representatives of the Council of Economic Advisers, and members of Califano's staff all examined the reports. The participants received continuous direction from the President as to his priorities. After much discussion and some bargaining, they developed a proposed legislative program which was presented to the President for final decisions.

The major task forces concerned with education during the Johnson Administration included: (1) the Gardner Task Force (1964); (2) the International Education Task Force chaired by Secretary of State Dean Rusk (1965); (3) the Ink Task Force (1965); (4) the 1966 Interagency Task Force; (5) the Task force on Early Childhood Development (1966); (6) the Friday Task Force (1966-67); (7) the 1967 Interagency Task Force; (8) the Interagency Task Force on Child Development (1967); (9) The Task Force on the Education of Gifted Persons (1967-68); (10) the Task Force on Urban Educational Opportunities (1967-68); (11) The Interagency Task Force on

Administration of Academic Science (1967-68); and (12) the Green Task Force (1968).

The reports of these task forces were made public in January, 1970. The remarks of former HEW Secretary Wilbur Cohen at ceremonies marking the release of President Johnson's education papers provide a brief summary of the consequences of this activity.[11] The Gardner Task Force of 1964 was responsible for Title III and contributed to Title IV of ESEA. The International Education Task Force developed the proposal for the International Education Act, which Congress passed in 1966 but refused to fund. The Ink Task Force developed the plan for the 1965 reorganization of USOE. The Interagency Task Forces of 1966 and 1967 proposed amendments to existing legislation which were embodied in presidential messages in the following years and some of them were eventually adopted. The Early Childhood Development Task Force recommendations were the basis for the "Follow Through" program and Parent and Child Centers in the Johnson Administration and for the establishment, during the Nixon Administration, of HEW's Office of Child Development. The Interagency Task Force on Child Development was involved in implementing the outside group's report and in reviewing all HEW programs for children. The Friday Task Force contributed recommendations that appeared in President Johnson's 1968 education message. The four remaining Task Forces produced substantial reports which are chocked full of recommendations that comprised a lengthy agenda for future action.

Although I have not had the opportunity to examine these reports and consequently have not traced the fate of the myriad

of recommendations and proposals they generated it is apparent that the early task forces had greater impact on legislation. As the task forces proliferated and the scope of their inquiry broadened, their uniqueness declined and their proposals became increasingly commonplace. In the last two years of the Johnson Administration, interagency task forces were centrally involved in policy formulation and played a more important role than outside groups.

Membership on the two task forces on which I have data was neither carefully balanced nor broadly representative. (See Table 1). The Gardner Task Force contained a wider range of individuals than

Table 1

Membership on Outside Task Forces in Education

	State and Local Officials	College Administrators	College Professors	Business	Foundation Officials	Other
1964	3	3	2	2	2	1
1967	2	6	3	0	1	1

the Friday group, which was dominated by academicians, but neither included representatives of national associations in education or other prominent lobby groups, e.g., the NAACP, the AFL-CIO, or the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Because the composition of the task forces was kept secret, the Administration could avoid striving for balanced representation in favor of imaginativeness. To the extent, however, that quickly saleable proposals were desired, task force membership tended to be more representative. In 1964, President Johnson sought a report from the Gardner Task Force that would serve as the basis for an immediate legislative triumph, hence it included business men and as many state and local officials as any other category. The Friday Task Force of 1967 had as its mission the development of solutions to problems in urban education and the financing of higher education. It was instructed to come up with approches at four different funding levels and not to worry about questions of political feasability. Its membership reflected the more theoretical character of its task.

Usually the President and his top policy advisers selected

the members of outside task forces. The selection process operated quite informally. The White House staff, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Office of Science and Technology, and in some cases the department and agency, suggested prospective members. The White House staff screened the initial nominations with the President making the final choices. As indicated above, the criteria for selection tended to vary with the mission of the task force. Many respondents emphasized the importance of independence of viewpoint, however, it was acknowledged that persons holding radical views were not likely to be included. Occasionally federal officials served on outside task forces, e.g. Commissioner Keppel and the Gardner Task Force, or they sat with them on a fairly regular basis, as did Secretary Gardner and Commissioner Howe with the Friday group. In selecting task forces a conscious effort was made to avoid formal representation of established clientele groups such as the NEA and the ACE which customarily worked closely with the HEW and USOE in developing policy. As OE's role in policy initiation began to decline as a consequence of the task force operation, the access of the lobby groups to policy makers who set the agenda for action also began to fall. These groups responded with hostility toward the task force.. A typical reaction was that of a higher education association official who stated that "The task forces represent the worse form of intellectual and educational elitism. They are based on the implicit assumption that the education associations are incapable of any sort of creative or innovative thought."[12] Input from the education establishment groups to the task forces was limited to brief presentations by a few leading figures such as former NEA Executive Secretary William Carr.

The task forces do not appear to have used formal votes to reach decisions. The usual mode of decision was bargaining until a consensus developed. When members raised strong objections, efforts were made to satisfy them. Although the task forces were not broadly representative, their members apparently did represent institutional and professional interests to a considerable degree during deliberations.

The secrecy of the task forces was one of their most important operational characteristics. In the eyes of President Johnson and his staff, secrecy was crucial for it enabled them to ignore proposals that were politically infeasible. Recommendations could be adopted or rejected without having to expend political resources defending the choices made. The range of options was not only maximized, it was kept open longer and at very little cost. Secrecy also prevented opposition to task force proposals from developing until a much later stage in the policy process.

There seems almost unanimous agreement among persons familiar with the task forces that competent staffing was essential to the success of their operations. Most education task forces were staffed with Bureau of the Budget personnel. They tended to prod the task forces to be venturesome. Their activities included preparing or assigning the conduct of background studies, acquiring data, drafting reports, and providing liaison with the White House.

HEW and USOE played an ambiguous role in the operation of the outside task forces in education. Since the manifest intent in using outside task forces was to bypass the bureaucracy, departmental and

agency officials tended to distrust task forces and minimize their significance. As Samuel Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of HEW for Legislation remarked, "The reports are kept so secret that they don't really pollinate anything."[13] However, the ex officio participation of some high-ranking HEW and USOE officials in the work of the Gardner and Friday task forces precluded official negative reactions to the reports. There were some officials who informally opposed the main recommendations of the Gardner Task Force. In interagency task forces, the primary department or agency dominated the proceedings. Commissioner Howe was the key figure in the work of the 1967 inside task force in education. That group developed the Administration's 1963 legislative program on the basis of recommendations of the Friday task force and agency submissions, however, the Friday task force report was not made available to all of the members of the inside group. At least part of the reason for the creation of the interagency group and the limited access given its members to the Friday task force report appears to have been the Administration's negative evaluation of the latter document.

The evaluation of the reports of outside task forces was a somewhat unstructured process. After being sent to the President and deposited with the Budget Bureau's Office of Legislative Reference, the reports went to the Bureau's examining devisions, other units in the presidency, and the agencies for comment. The role of the agencies was minor, however, compared with that of the Bureau of the Budget and the White House staff. Significantly, the same personnel from the Bureau and the White House who served on task force staffs and sat with them as liaison men were usually involved in evaluating the reports.

The dual role of the Bureau and the White House staff meant that the reports had an Executive Office bias which was not openly acknowledged. One HEW official charged that "there is an incestuous relationship between the task forces on the one hand and the Budget Bureau and the White House on the other."[14] The Bureau was aware of its dual role and the problems inherent in it. According to the staff director for the Gardner and Friday task forces, "I leaned over backward to be fair, but I did feel like I was meeting myself coming back."[15] Or, as William Carey the Assistant Director in charge of the Human Resources Division, observed, "We are involved at the Bureau with task forces as participants and as critics,"[16] But the dual role was perplexing and frustrating for those outside the presidency who were affected by its actions.

It is, of course, impossible to measure directly the effects of task force reports on education policy. They had only a limited impact on the development of the budget which proceeded in customary fashion and was altered mainly by the introduction of PPBS. But there is little question that the independent advice and suggestions provided by the task forces helped to shape the broad outlines of President Johnson's legislative program and provided some specific proposals as well. One of the most innovative programs of ESEA, Title III, clearly originated with the Gardner task force and Title IV received a major push from it. Most of the recommendations of the 1966 Early Childhood task force were adopted, although at lower funding levels than recommended. On the other hand, only a few recommendations of the 1967 Friday task force, principally the Networks for Knowledge and the Partnership for Learning and Ea

proposals, appeared in the Administration's 1963 education bills. The muted impact of the Friday task force report can be explained in part by its focus on long-range rather than immediate problems and by political and budgetary constraints imposed by the Vietnam war.

There are indications that the flexibility and adaptability of the task forces, at least in education, had begun to decline as their operations became increasingly systematized toward the end of the Johnson Administration. They were tending to become elaborate instruments of incremental adjustment rather than catalytic agents of change. A leadership technique designed to produce policy innovation worked so well initially that overuse was rendering it counterproductive. It also appears that the substantive innovations resulting from the task forces may have been less than their advocates claimed. As a Bureau of the Budget official acknowledged, "they tended to pull together existing things instead of coming up with new ideas."[17]

To the extent that task forces were made representative through their membership, tendencies toward innovation may have been mitigated. This appears likely since consensus was the fundamental decision-making rule and final agreement tended to represent compromise rather than creative thinking. However, the fact that task forces may not have been as inventive as their proponents claimed does not mean that essentially the same courses of action would be followed without them. The ideas which they promoted may not have been entirely new, but they were not yet embodied in the presidential policy agenda, nor, in most cases, were they supported

by the bureaucracy.

Although the task force device provided a substantial advantage to an innovation-minded President, it also entailed sizeable costs in the form of resentments engendered in the bureaucracy and among powerful clientele groups. But whatever its costs and benefits, the Johnson task force operation enabled the President to dominate national policy formulation in education and several other areas. Its failure to survive in the Nixon Administration reflects the different leadership style and policy objectives of Johnson's successor and not the insignificance of the task forces as they functioned between 1964 and 1969.

THE PRESIDENCY AND POLICY CONTROL

Policy formulation in the education policy system centered, then, in the presidency. The key participants were the President, the White House staff members and Budget Bureau officials. Acting in response to explicit presidential directives or in accordance with their interpretations of more general presidential objectives, the central decision-makers set education policy priorities within the parameters imposed by budgetary constraints and other external considerations. Also included among the central decision-makers were the Commissioner of Education and selected HEW officials. Their involvement, while frequent and often intensive, was regulated by the presidency. They were necessarily included as leaders and representatives of the bureaucracy and they wielded substantial influence in consequence of their positions. Additional influence and involvement was based on their standing with members of the institutionalized presidency. Both Commissioner Howe and Secretary

Gardner, until his departure, were held in high regard and exerted considerable influence on personal rather than positional grounds.

Of equal significance in this analysis of educational policy formulation, were the kinds of participants who were not included. Not surprisingly, in contrast to the direct participation of congressional leaders in policy formulation in 1964 and 1965, there was little involvement during the 90th Congress (1967-1969). Congressional leaders were informed of the content of the legislative program before it was made final, but they were not consulted during its development. The major legislative innovations of the 89th Congress were not repeated in the 90th, although the Administration continued the search for new ideas and attempted to give the appearance of creativity in its legislative proposals by authorizing small programs which could later be expanded. There was no need for early or sustained congressional involvement in what was basically a noninovating period. Loyal Administration spokesmen on the Hill--Perkins, Brademas, and Morse--could be relied on to push the ESEA, HEA, and Voc. Ed. extension bills through along with the eye-catching but minor new programs and, most importantly, to ward off opposition attempts to redirect the basic legislation, e.g., the Quie Amendment. Congressional considerations under such conditions could be effectively incorporated during the adoption of legislation. The education establishment groups were accorded limited access to the formulation stage through their White House contact, Douglass Cater. The education association respondents who spoke to the matter complained of their lack of access to the Bureau of the Budget. Non-education groups, including labor, civil rights, and other black organizations,

were conspicuous by their absence during the formulative stage.[18]

Although priorities were determined and the policy agenda set by a group of central decision-makers operating in the presidency, there were effective limits to the scope of their action. For example, in spite of a strong preference in the presidency for imaginative programs that would change American education, some highly innovative proposals, such as the Educational Opportunity Bank (EOB), were kept off the policy agenda by strong opposition from certain higher education groups and from key members of Congress. The prospect of conflict with some major supporters of the Administration's education policies prevented the EOB from receiving serious consideration. Anticipated reaction accorded strategic interests a veto without a fight. Once the Land Grant College Association attacked it publicly, the EOB was a dead letter.

Much of the decision-making regarding the policy agenda did not take place in public, however. Task force reports and, to a large extent agency submissions, were the subject of debate and negotiation inside the presidency. Direct congressional and interest group input was readily available, but generally it was obtained indirectly through brokers. The principal brokers in the education policy system were HEW's legislative liaison officials, Ralph Huitt and S muel Halperin. Both were highly regarded by the establishment associations and both had the confidence and support of top HEW officials. Halperin in particular had developed extensive contacts in Congress, most of which were favorable to him. Huitt and Halperin were able to assess the viability or saleability of various proposals "on the Hill" and with the lobby groups. Those assessments were of critical importance in program formulation

Because of his active, often aggressive style of operation, Halperin appeared to be a powerful mover of ideas. This visibility had its costs, however, for some Budget Bureau participants in the policy system tended to regard him skeptically. They recognized his value to them in predicting congressional and interest group reations and in steering legislation through Congress, but they questioned his loyalty to the presidency. They viewed him as too protective of the interests of the education associations, too defensive of HEW and USOE programs, and insufficiently sympathetic to their own interpretation of the presidential emphasis on change. What they failed to recognize was that his value to the presidency stemmed from his wide reputation in the policy system as an honest broker.

In spite of the constraints imposed through anticipated congressional and interest group reactions and indirect external influence exerted through brokers, the formulation stage of the policy process remained under the effective control of the institutionalized presidency. The effectiveness of the presidency in establishing priorities and setting the agenda for action is reflected in the hostility that several respondents expressed to the Bureau of the Budget and the White House staff. Of 33 responses to a question which asked if the major elements involved in making and implementing education policy ought to be more or less powerful, 12 called for a reduction in the power of the Budget Bureau or the White House staff. (See Table 2). Although these data cannot be regarded as accurate reflections of the policy system participants' perception of the conversion process, they do indicate the presence of extensive

Table

Perceptions of Power Distribution in Policy System by Policy Role

Role	Generally Satisfied	Generally Dissat.	BOB/J. Has Too Powerful	Foundations Too Powerful	Own Group Requires More Power
Bureaucrat	2	2	5	1	3
Legislator			1	1	
Leg. Staff	1		3		1
Lobbyist		3	3	3	1
Expert	2	1			
Total	5	6	12	5	5

N=33

dissatisfaction with the preceived balance of power in the system. The Bureau of the Budget was the focus of much of that dissatisfaction. Bureaucrats, legislative staff members, and lobbyists particularly tended to regard it as too powerful. Their complaints were directed toward the Bureau's role in developing legislative proposals and establishing basic policy goals rather than its budgetary role. A recurring theme was the Bureau's lack of expertise in education. Typical of the Bureau's negative image among other policy system members were the comments of a bureaucrat:

> The Budget Bureau strikes me as moving a bit too far into content questions which they aren't competent to carry through. Here and there, because of the frantic pace, many thoughtful program people are at the mercy of the Budget Bureau people who don't know what is in the black book.[19]

A legislator:

> The Budget Bureau is far too powerful. It is much too influential in setting national priorities. More so than any other element in the process. This is especially disturbing since the Budget Bureau people have no special competence or expertise in education. They are generalists who have no knowledge of the real needs and problems.[20]

A legislative staff member:

> The Budget Bureau is exercising too much control. It plays two roles. Before OE and HEW can come up with legislative proposals, the Budget Bureau must approve. I don't know where they get the competence to do it...Secondly, when appropriation requests are being made I have less quarrel.[21]

And, a lobbyist:

> The Bureau of the Budget ought to be deemphasized. They don't know enough about education. They have a transitory staff and the directors are laymen.[22]

Objections to the foundations and expressions of general discontent were much less explicit.

For a significant portion of the members of the education policy system, then, too much control over policy was lodged in the institutionalized presidency. The problem was not so much that the President with the help of his supportive staff aides and units defined goals, established priorities, and set the agenda, but that access to that critical stage of formulation was limited and tightly controlled. As the NEA's principal lobbyist, Dr. John Lumley, remarked in discussing the Bureau of the Budget,"it is the one place in the system which is closed to us. Other than trouble getting access to the Budget Bureau, we have our day in court everywhere else."[23] Yet, it was that very lack of open access to congressional, clientele, bureaucratic, and other interests that enabled the Bureau to serve the President so effectively and which led Presidents since Roosevelt to rely so heavily on its judgement. The absence of professional experts in the Bureau and on the White House staff was no handicap to a President whose primary goal for Federal educational programs was to promote change. The absence of

education professionals in the presidency was partially compensated for by the inclusion of Commissioner Howe among the central decision-makers, the ready availability of input from external interests, and the acquired expertise of Bureau of the Budget personnel. Had President Johnson not been so disposed to promote change through Federal programs, the Bureau's influence would probably have been considerably less. Even so, if one notes only casually the visible effects or outcomes of the education policy "innovation" of the Johnson Administration it is apparent that the Bureau's impact was somewhat exaggerated. The education programs of the Administration contributed more to the maintanence of existing educational systems than to the promotion of fundamental changes. Programs with potential for breakthrough change, e.g., ESEA Title III, were brought under control of the establishment by the end of 1967 despite the protests of the presidency, the reports of task forces, and the arguments of intellectuals and experts in universities and foundations.

Conclusion

One of the hallmarks of President Johnson's Great Society was a strong commitment to education with a heavy emphasis on innovation. He wanted the federal role in education to produce qualitative improvements and he wished to be remembered as a President who accomplished a great deal for education. Even as budgetary pressures forced a reduction of the ambitious funding levels visualized in the legislation of 1964 and 1965, he maintained the aspirations which underlay his commitment to education. As a consequence, the presidency remained centrally involved in the education policy system throughout the Johnson Administration. The activities of the participants in that system in formulating public policy reflected that domination.

The usual flow of demands from the field and the education associations, through Congress and USOE continued, but the innovativeness which the President sought could not be obtained, so it was believed, if the bureaucracy remained the primary source of legislative proposals and other policy suggestions. The result was the establishment of a special means of generating new ideas, the task force device. Policy system participants in the Bureau of the Budget and on the White House staff ~~members~~ sought to safeguard the presidential emphasis on innovation. This led them to adopt a highly critical view of USOE and its supportive clientele groups, a view which was met with resentment and hostility in those quarters.

In retrospect, it appears that that reaction occured more out of pique at exclusion from the inner workings of the policy system than from deprivations suffered as a consequence of the system's

operations. The major policy innovations occured in the legislation of 1964 and 1965. What followed were primarily corrective adjustments, modest new proposals, and assorted gimmicks. The establishment associations and the bureaucracy were kept at the periphery, or at least out of the limelight, not because they no longer mattered, but because they were incompatible with and detracted from the image of innovative educational policy that the President sought to cultivate.

Indeed, by the start of the 90th Congress in January, 1967, a new equilibrium involving the presidency, USOE, its clientele groups, and the congressional subcommittees with jurisdiction over its authorizing legislation and its appropriations had been established. The dominance of the presidency in policy formulation in that equilibrium cannot be denied, but it must be noted that the system lacked resources to sustain additional major policy innovations and it needed time to absorb fully and evaluate the effects of ESEA and the other breakthroughs of the mid-1960's. Therefore, too much significance should not be attached to the Goldbergian process developed in the latter years of the Johnson Administration to formulate educational policy.[24] Much of that machinery has since been dismantled, but the policies and the programs that implement them remain largely in effect. USOE and the establishment associations continue to function as integral parts of the educational policy system while the task force reports peacefully accumulate dust in the L.B.J. Library.

However, when and if some future President decides that the time has arrived for a new round of innovations in Federal education policy, those reports will undoubtedly have some utility and the Johnson Administrations's policy formulation procedure will be of

considerable value as a model strategy for circumventing, if only temporarily, the Federal bureaucracy and its congressional and clientele group supporters.

FOOTNOTES

1. Adam Yarmolinsky, "Ideas into Programs," The Public Interest, No. 2, Winter 1966, p. 73.

2. See Richard E. Neustadt, "The Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Central Clearance," American Political Science Review, vol. 48 (1954) pp. 641-670; and his "The Presidency and Legislation: Planning the President's Program," ibid., vol. 49 (1955) pp. 980-1013.

3. Quoted in William E. Leuchtenberg, "The Genesis of the Great Society," The Reporter, April 21, 1966, pp. 36-39.

4. See Norman C. Thomas and Harold L. Wolman, "The Presidency and Policy Formulation: The Task Force Device," Public Administration Review, vol. 29, Sept/Oct 1969, pp. 459-471. The following pages draw heavily from this article, my contribution to which was a product of this study of the education policy system. Portions of the article are incorporated with the permission of the Public Administration Review and Harold L. Wolman.

5. A sharp differentiation of the functions of policy-planning and legislative liaison occured on the Johnson White House staff with the policy-planners enjoying greater influence and status. See Thomas E. Cronin, "The Presidency and Education," Phi Delta Kappan, February, 1963, pp. 295-299. This was an interesting and somewhat surprising development given Johnson's reputation as a legislative wizard.

6. Interview, Harold Howe II, January 9, 1963.

7. Confidential interview.

8. Confidential interview.

9. Louis Koenig's prediction, made in 1964 at the outset of the Johnson Presidency, that the White House staff would play a reduced and the old-line departments a greater role in policy-formulation did not prove correct. The reverse occured. Op. cit., pp. 132-133.

10. See James M. Burns, Presidential Government (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966) p. 1[illegible].

11. Wilbur A. Cohen, "Education Legislation 1963-68 From Various Vantage Points," unpublished paper presented at the LBJ Library, Austin, Texas, January 24, 197[illegible].

12. Confidential interview.

13. Interview, Samuel Halperin, December 11, 1967.

14. Ibid.

15. Interview, William Cannon, April 30, 1963.

16. Interview, William Carey, January 23, 1963.

17. Confidential interview.

18. See Harold L. Wilkinson and Norman C. Thomas, "Black Interests, Black Groups, and Black Influence in the Federal Policy Process: The Case of Housing and Education," Journal of Politics Vol. [illegible] (November 1970) pp. 775-797.

19. Interview, Paul Miller, January 10, 1963.

20. Interview, Edith Green, February [illegible], 1963.

21. Interview, John Forsythe, January 16, 1963.

22. Interview, Edgar Fuller, February 7, 1963.

23. Interview, John Lumley, March 1, 1963.

24. The development during the Johnson Administration of a policy formulation process for education dominated by the presidency was paralled in other policy arenas. See for example Harold Wolman, Politics of Federal Housing (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1971). The further institutionalization of the presidency through the task force operation and expanded White House staff and Bureau of the Budget policy-making role resulted in a corresponding reduction in the role of HEW and USOE. Alexander George questions whether the benefits of increased centralization of policy planning in the presidency outweighs the costs. See "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," American Political Science Review Vol. LXVI (1972) pp. 751-785. In the education policy system, the lost contributions of the bureaucracy to policy analysis and development and the hostility of the agency and its clientele must be balanced against the attempt to preserve the Administration's emphasis on innovation. The exchange appears to have been about even to this writer.